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Demography	and	public	health 	
Introduction	to	demography	and	public	health
The	health	and	healthcare	needs	of	a	population	cannot	be	measured	or	met	without
knowledge	of	its	size	and	characteristics.	Demography	is	concerned	with	this	and	with
understanding	population	dynamics—how	populations	change	in	response	to	the	interplay
between	fertility,	mortality,	and	migration.	This	understanding	is	a	prerequisite	for	making	the
forecasts	about	future	population	size	and	structure	which	should	underpin	healthcare
planning.	Such	analyses	necessitate	a	review	of	the	past.	The	number	of	very	old	people	in	a
population,	for	example,	depends	on	the	number	of	births	eight	or	nine	decades	earlier	and
risks	of	death	at	successive	ages	throughout	the	intervening	period.	The	proportion	of	very	old
people	depends	partly	on	this	numerator	but	more	importantly	on	the	denominator,	the	size	of
the	population	as	a	whole.	The	number	of	births	in	a	population	depends	on	current	patterns	of
family	building,	and	also	on	the	number	of	women	‘at	risk’	of	reproduction—itself	a	function	of
past	trends	in	fertility	and	mortality.	Similarly,	the	number	and	causes	of	deaths	are	strongly
influenced	by	age	structure.
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Demography	is	largely	concerned	with	answering	questions	about	how	populations	change
and	their	measurement.	The	broader	field	of	population	studies	embraces	questions	of	why
these	changes	occur,	and	with	what	consequences.
This	chapter	presents	information	on	demographic	methods	and	data	sources	and	their
application	to	health	and	population	issues,	together	with	information	on	demographic	trends
and	their	implications	and	the	major	theories	about	demographic	change,	in	order	to	elucidate
the	complex	interrelationship	between	population	change	and	human	health.
Global	issues
Fig.	6.3.1	shows	that	the	world’s	population	has	recently	been	growing	at	an	unprecedented
rate	and	was	estimated	to	be	7.05	billion	at	mid	2012	(UN	2011).	While	it	took	an	estimated	123
years	(from	1804	to	1927)	for	the	world	to	increase	its	population	from	1	to	2	billion,	the
increase	from	6	to	7	billion	was	achieved	in	a	tenth	of	the	time	(1999–2011).	The	United
Nation’s	(UN’s)	medium	projection	suggests	a	further	increase	of	some	2.3	billion	by	2050	(UN
2011).	Beyond	this,	there	is	a	good	chance	that	global	population	growth	will	cease	by	the	end
of	the	twenty-first	century	(Lutz	and	Samir	2010).
Fig.	6.3.1
Population	and	projected	population	of	the	world	and	more,	less,	and	least	developed	regions,
1950–2050.
Source:	data	from	United	Nations,	World	Population	Prospects:	The	2010	Revision,	United
Nations,	New	York,	USA,	Copyright	©	2011,	available	from	http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-
Data/population.htm.
This	prospect	of	global	population	stability	masks	huge	differences	between	regions	and
between	richer	and	poorer	countries.	Between	1950	and	2000,	77	per	cent	of	world	population
growth	occurred	in	countries	currently	designated	by	the	UN	as	less	developed	(excluding	the
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least	developed,	see	Box	6.3.1	for	definitions);	13	per	cent	in	least	developed	countries	and	11
per	cent	in	more	developed	regions.	Between	2000	and	2050,	medium-term	projections
suggest	that	population	growth	in	more	developed	regions	will	account	for	only	4	per	cent	of
the	total	with	63	per	cent	occurring	in	less	developed	countries	and	33	per	cent	in	the	least
developed	countries.	These	projections	imply	that	by	2050	the	share	of	the	world’s	population
living	in	currently	more	developed	regions	will	account	for	only	14	per	cent	of	the	total	world
population—compared	with	32	per	cent	a	century	earlier—while	the	representation	of	those	in
the	poorest	countries	will	have	increased	from	8	per	cent	of	the	total	in	1950	to	19	per	cent	in
2050.
Box	6.3.1	Country	and	regional	classifications	by	level	of	development
The	UN	classifies	countries	into	‘more’	and	‘less’	developed	and	also	identifies	a	group	of
50	‘least	developed’	countries.	The	more	developed	category	includes	all	of	Europe,	North
America,	Australia,	New	Zealand,	and	Japan.	The	least	developed	countries	are	mostly	in
sub-Saharan	Africa	but	also	include	Afghanistan,	Bangladesh,	Cambodia,	and	Myanmar.
The	classification	has	some	anomalies	in	that	some	wealthy	Asian	and	Near	Eastern
countries	are	counted	as	less	developed	(e.g.	South	Korea,	Singapore,	Cyprus,	Israel)
whereas	some	poorer	former	Eastern	bloc	countries	are	treated	as	more	developed	(e.g.
Albania,	Belarus,	Bulgaria).
The	World	Bank	employs	a	classification	based	on	gross	national	income	per	capita	which
divides	countries	into	high-,	middle-,	and	low-income	groups,	with	a	subdivision	of	the
middle	into	upper	and	lower.	Some	of	the	countries	(principally	from	Eastern	Europe)
classified	by	the	UN	as	developed	fall	into	middle-income	categories,	while	some	of	the	UN
less	developed	group	are	classified	by	the	World	Bank	as	middle	income	(principally	Latin
American)	or	high	income	(some	South	East	Asian).
Membership	of	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD)	is
also	sometimes	used	as	an	indicator	of	developed	country	status;	members	include	Russia
and	Mexico,	both	of	which	are	classified	by	the	World	Bank	as	middle-	rather	than	high-
income	countries.
The	Human	Development	Index	compiled	by	the	UN	Development	Programme	takes	into
account	factors	other	than	income,	such	as	school	enrolment,	literacy,	and	levels	of
mortality.
Regional	groupings	employed	by	different	international	agencies	also	vary	slightly.	Further
details	of	all	these	classifications	are	available	on	the	relevant	organizations’	websites.
While	some	regions	grapple	with	the	needs	of	rapidly	growing	populations,	such	as	large
increases	in	requirements	for	child	health	services	and	schools,	others	face	challenges	of
population	ageing	and,	in	some	cases,	population	decline.	By	2025,	nearly	a	quarter	of	the
Western	European	population	is	expected	to	be	aged	65	or	more	and	in	some	countries,
such	as	Japan,	South	Korea,	Spain,	and	Italy,	projections	suggest	that	a	third	or	more	of	the
population	will	be	aged	65	and	over	by	2050	(UN	2011).
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These	hugely	differing	rates	of	growth	arise	from	differences	in	vital	rates,	and	associated	large
variations	in	age	structures,	which	are	illustrated	for	regions	and	selected	countries	within	them
in	Table	6.3.1.	In	a	number	of	European	countries	and	some	Asian	countries,	such	as	Japan,
women	on	average	have	only	1.4	children	or	fewer	(see	Box	6.3.2	for	derivation	of	total	fertility
rate),	and	people	aged	65	and	over	outnumber	children	under	15.	In	sub-Saharan	Africa,
women	on	average	have	five	children	each,	40	per	cent	or	more	of	the	population	is	aged	15
or	under,	and	only	3	per	cent	aged	65	or	more.
Table	6.3.1	Indicators	of	age	structure,	fertility,	and	mortality:	world	regions	and	selected
countries,	2011
Region/country Proportion	(%)	of
population	aged:
Total
fertility
rate
Life
expectancy	at
birth	(years)
<15 65	and
over
Africa 41 3 4.6 58
Sub-
Saharan
43 3 5.0 56
Northern 33 5 3.1 70
Asia 25 7 2.2 70
India 30 5 2.6 67
China 18 9 1.5 75
Japan 14 23 1.4 84
Indonesia 27 6 2.3 71
South
Korea
16 11 1.2 79
Australia 18 14 1.8 82
Europe 15 16 1.6 76
Italy 14 20 1.4 82
Poland 15 14 1.3 76
Germany 13 21 1.4 80
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Germany 13 21 1.4 80
Sweden 15 20 1.7 81
Ukraine 14 15 1.3 69
UK 17 16 1.9 80
Latin	America
and	Caribbean
27 7 2.2 74
Brazil 25 7 1.8 73
Chile 22 9 1.9 78
Guatemala 38 4 3.3 71
North	America 19 14 2.0 79
United
States
20 13 2.1 78
World 26 8 2.4 68
Source:	data	from	United	States	Census	Bureau,	Population	Division,	International	Programs
Center,	International	Data	Base,	available	from
http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php.
Levels	of	mortality,	and	associated	differences	in	age	and	cause	distribution	of	death,	also
vary	markedly.	In	some	high-income	countries,	average	life	expectancy	at	birth	is	above	80,
while	in	some	sub-Saharan	countries	it	is	below	50,	substantially	because	of	HIV/AIDS.	As
shown	in	Fig.	6.3.2,	in	Sierra	Leone,	40	per	cent	of	all	deaths	in	a	year	are	of	infants	and
children	aged	under	5,	compared	with	0.3	per	cent	in	Japan.	Conversely,	of	all	deaths,	70	per
cent	in	Japan	and	50	per	cent	in	Chile,	a	middle-income	country,	are	of	people	aged	75	and
over;	equivalent	proportions	for	Egypt	and	Sierra	Leone	are	20	per	cent	and	8	per	cent
respectively.	These	variations	have	enormous	implications	for	health	and	healthcare	priorities
in,	and	beyond,	the	populations	concerned.	Divergence	in	population	growth	between	regions
of	the	world	is	also	fuelling	mass	migration,	which	itself	has	implications	for	global	population
health	(Fernandes	et	al.	2007).
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Fig.	6.3.2
Cumulative	distribution	of	deaths	by	age;	Sierra	Leone	2009,	Egypt	2009,	Chile	2008,	Japan
2009.
Source:	data	from	United	Nations	Department	of	Economic	and	Social	Affairs,	Demographic
Yearbook	2011,	ST/ESA/STAT/SER.R/41,	United	Nations,	New	York,	USA,	Copyright	©	United
Nations	2012,	available	from
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dybsets/2011.pdf
Closely	related	to	variations	in	the	distribution	of	deaths	by	age	are	differences	in	the	cause
structure	of	death.	As	shown	in	Table	6.3.2,	communicable	diseases,	maternal	and	perinatal
conditions,	and	nutritional	deficiencies	account	for	67	per	cent	of	all	deaths	in	sub-Saharan
Africa	but	only	5	per	cent	in	Europe.	Conversely,	non-communicable	diseases	are	responsible
for	25	per	cent	of	deaths	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	66	per	cent	in	Asia,	but	88	per	cent	in	Europe.
While	in	parts	of	the	world,	communicable	diseases	and	reproductive	and	child	health	present
the	most	pressing	public	health	problems,	concerns	about	the	prevalence	of	age-related
chronic	degenerative	diseases	predominate	in	others.	In	sub-Saharan	Africa,	1.2	million	deaths
are	due	to	HIV/AIDS.	Although	the	numbers	of	such	deaths	are	estimated	to	have	peaked
globally	around	2005	(UNAIDS	2012),	they	still	represent	a	substantial	and	long-term	burden
(UN	2011).
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Table	6.3.2	Distribution	of	deaths	(%)	by	cause	group	and	world	region,	2010
Communicable Non-
communicable
Injuries
Global 24.9 65.5 9.6
Europe 5.1 88.3 6.6
North	America 5.3 88.0 6.8
High-income	Asia	and	Pacific 11.4 81.1 7.5
Oceania 15.1 78.1 6.9
Latin	America	and	Caribbean 14.2 69.0 16.8
North	Africa	and	Middle	East 16.2 75.2 8.6
Asia	(excl.	high-income	and	Middle
East)
23.3 66.2 10.4
sub-Saharan	Africa 66.5 24.9 8.6
Source:	data	from	Global	Burden	of	Disease	Study	2010,	Mortality	Results	1970–2010,
Institute	for	Health	Metrics	and	Evaluation	(IHME),	Seattle,	Washington,	USA,	Copyright	©
2012,	available	from	http://ghdx.healthdata.org/record/global-burden-disease-study-2010-
gbd-2010-mortality-results-1970-2010.
The	process	that	separates	populations	with	high	fertility,	relatively	high	mortality,	young	age
structures,	and	rapid	growth	from	those	with	low	vital	rates,	older	age	structures,	and	slow	or
no	growth,	is	conceptualized	as	the	demographic	transition.	Identifying,	and	explaining,	this
and	associated	profound	changes	in	health	has	been	a	central	preoccupation	of	modern
demography	(Lee	2003).	Before	turning	to	these	issues,	the	basic	methods	and	materials	of
demographic	analysis	must	be	considered	and	the	issue	of	population	dynamics—how
populations	change—addressed.
Demographic	data	and	methods	of	analysis
In	the	seventeenth	century,	John	Graunt,	a	London	merchant,	used	data	from	the	London	Bills
of	Mortality	to	devise	an	early	life	table,	leading	to	him	being	dubbed	the	‘father	of	modern
demography’.	However,	while	Graunt	had	information	on	numbers	of	deaths,	he	lacked	data	on
the	population	at	risk	and	could	not	compute	death	rates.	Essentially	all	demographic	analysis
requires	data	both	on	the	population	‘stock’	and	on	‘flows’	in	and	out—births,	deaths,	and
migration.	The	traditional	sources	of	information	on	the	former	are	population	censuses	and,	for
Demography and public health
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the	latter,	vital	registration	systems.
Population	censuses
The	first	‘modern’	censuses	were	undertaken	in	Scandinavia	in	the	eighteenth	century.
Censuses	spread	throughout	Europe	during	the	nineteenth	century	and	most	of	the	rest	of	the
world	in	the	twentieth.	As	well	as	basic	questions	about	age,	sex,	marital	status,	and	place	of
residence,	data	on	other	characteristics	such	as	employment,	education	and	housing	are	often
collected.	The	UN	recommends	that	censuses	be	conducted	at	least	decennially	in	years
ending	in	0	or	1.
Censuses	have	many	strengths	and	are	often	the	only	source	of	data	for	small	areas	or
population	subgroups.	Although	primarily	a	tool	for	collecting	data	on	population	‘stock’,
censuses	have	also	been	used	to	find	out	about	vital	events.	Many	countries	use	censuses	to
provide	data	on	recent	internal	migration	(through	questions	on	place	of	residence	1	or	more
years	earlier)	and	immigration	(through	questions	on	country	of	birth	and/or	date	of	entry	for
those	born	elsewhere).	Indirect	estimation	techniques	developed	by	Brass	and	others	mean
that	questions	on	number	of	children	born	and	number	who	have	died,	on	widowhood,	and
orphanhood	are	widely	used	to	assess	mortality	levels	and	trends	using	both	censuses	and
surveys	in	countries	with	deficient	vital	registration	systems	(Preston	et	al.	2001).
However,	censuses	involve	huge	costs	and	the	challenge	of	ensuring	acceptable	data	quality.
Approaches	to	reducing	cost	(and	improving	quality)	include	use	of	sample	censuses,	either
for	the	census	as	a	whole,	as	in	China,	or	for	more	detailed	questions,	as	in	the	United	States.
Census	taking	requires	not	only	a	reasonable	administrative	infrastructure,	but	also	the
cooperation	of	the	population	to	be	enumerated.	Some	countries	have	given	up	taking
censuses	because	the	latter	is	lacking	and	now	rely	on	large-scale	surveys	or	‘virtual
censuses’	based	on	population	registration	data.	The	twenty-first	century	is	seeing	more
countries	adopting	alternatives	as	the	information	required	by	governments	becomes	more
complex	and	the	difficulties	of	mass	data	collection	escalate.	In	2010,	only	11	of	the	27	current
European	Union	members	conducted	traditional	censuses	(Valente	2010).
When	censuses	are	taken,	difficulties	arising	from	errors	and	omissions	are	common,	even	in
countries	with	a	long	history	of	census	taking.	Young,	geographically	mobile	adults,	recent
(especially	unauthorized)	immigrants,	members	of	minority	ethnic	groups,	infants,	and	the	very
old	are	those	most	likely	to	be	under-enumerated—some	of	the	very	groups	that	policymakers
and	health	professionals	may	be	most	keen	to	know	about.
Groups	such	as	seasonal	migrants,	military	personnel,	people	temporarily	away	from	home,
and	those	with	more	than	one	residence	also	present	problems.	Not	only	are	they	more	likely	to
be	missed,	but	a	decision	has	to	be	made	about	whether	they	should	be	assigned	to	their	place
of	usual	or	legal	residence	(assuming	it	can	be	determined),	or	counted	as	belonging	to	the
place	of	enumeration.	The	former	system	is	termed	de	jure,	the	latter	de	facto.	The	issue	of
assigning	people	to	some	place	of	usual	residence	is	important	as	often	resources	are
allocated	based	on	population	size	and	characteristics.	Moreover,	it	is	essential	to	try	and
ensure	that	demographic	events	recorded	in	one	system	(vital	registration)	are	attributed	to	the
population	actually	‘at	risk’	of	experiencing	them.	In	richer	countries,	for	example,	most	deaths
occur	in	hospitals	which	may	draw	patients	from	a	wide	area.	If	these	decedents	are	not
assigned	to	the	locality	where	they	lived	prior	to	hospital	admission,	areas	including	large
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hospitals	will	appear	to	have	very	high	mortality	rates	while	in	others,	recorded	mortality	will	be
artificially	low.
Under-enumeration	is	usually	assessed	through	census	validation	surveys	(surveys	of	a
sample	of	census	addresses	in	which	intensive	efforts	are	made	to	contact	non-respondents
and	check	information	supplied	by	respondents)	and	comparisons	with	population	estimates
from	other	sources.	Beyond	ensuring	near-complete	enumeration,	the	quality	of	the	data
collected	is	also	a	major	concern.
In	many	populations,	people	may	not	always	know	their	exact	age	and	some	approximation	is
reported	or	made	by	an	enumerator.	‘Heaping’	on	ages	ending	in	0	or	5	is	a	common	result.
Heaping	can	be	detected	by	looking	at	the	age	distribution	and	applying	various	tests	of
consistency	and	such	data	are	normally	adjusted	before	publication.	More	serious	problems
arise	when	reported	age	is	based	on	other	characteristics,	such	as	marital	status,	number	of
children	or	grandparent	status,	as	clearly	any	analysis	of,	for	example,	age	at	first	marriage,
will	be	biased	if	people’s	report	of	their	age	is	influenced	by	their	marital	status.
Vital	registration
Data	on	demographic	events,	as	well	as	on	population	characteristics,	are	needed.	In	richer
countries	these	are	drawn	from	vital	registration.	Compulsory	registration	of	births	and	deaths
was	established	in	most	European	countries	during	the	nineteenth	century.	In	England	and
Wales,	for	example,	civil	registration	was	introduced	in	1837.	Subsequent	improvements	to	the
system	included	those	following	the	1874	Births	and	Deaths	Registration	Act	which	made
parents	legally	responsible	for	registering	births	and	required	attending	physicians	to	supply
information	on	cause	of	death.	Other	revisions	have	since	been	made,	for	example,	the
inclusion	of	first	mother’s	and	later	father’s	age	and	in	2012,	recording	of	all	children
previously	born,	rather	than	just	legitimate	ones,	on	the	confidential	section	of	birth	certificates.
Most	high-income	countries	have	well-established	registration	systems	with	complete,	or	very
near	complete,	coverage.	In	poorer	parts	of	the	world,	however,	vital	registration	systems	are
frequently	seriously	incomplete	or	non-existent,	although	there	are	exceptions	and	some
countries,	including	India	and	China,	have	sample	registration	systems	for	selected	areas.
Currently	only	about	a	third	of	deaths	estimated	to	occur	globally	are	registered	and	reported
to	the	World	Health	Organization,	although	if	the	sample	registration	systems	in	India	and	China
are	considered	as	sufficiently	representative	of	their	national	populations,	this	proportion	rises
to	72	per	cent	(Mathers	et	al.	2005).
The	quality	of	the	information	supplied	and	coded	is	of	course	very	important.	No	one	registers
their	own	death	and	the	information	obtained	from	proxy	informants	may	be	inaccurate.
Differential	reporting	of	age,	occupation,	marital	status,	or	other	characteristics	in	the	census
and	in	other	sources,	such	as	death	certificates,	presents	a	further	difficulty.	Numerator–
denominator	discrepancies	may	introduce	serious	bias	into	the	analysis	of	mortality	at
advanced	ages,	or	by	characteristics	such	as	occupationally	defined	social	class,	marital
status,	or	ethnicity	(Williams	et	al.	2006).	The	Nordic	and	some	other	European	countries	avoid
these	problems	by	maintaining	well-developed	register-based	systems	that	link	vital	registration
data	to	population,	occupational,	and	educational	registers.	One	study	of	marital	status
differences	in	mortality	at	older	ages	found	marked	differences	in	results	for	countries	using
traditional	and	register-based	systems	(Murphy	et	al.	2007).
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Cause	of	death
Death	certificates	are	the	major	source	of	information	on	cause	of	death.	In	richer	countries,
cause	of	death	is	generally	certified	by	a	physician	and	coded	according	to	the	International
Classification	of	Diseases	(ICD)	which	originated	from	work	undertaken	by	the	nineteenth-
century	British	medical	statistician,	William	Farr.	The	tenth	revision	of	the	ICD	came	into	use
from	1994	and	included	nearly	twice	as	many	codes	as	ICD-9.	ICD-11	is	in	preparation	and	is
expected	to	come	into	use	in	2015.	National	preferences,	as	well	as	ICD	revisions,	may
influence	assignment	of	cause	of	death,	as	illustrated	in	a	number	of	classic	papers	in	which
case	studies	of	deaths	were	distributed	to	physicians	in	different	countries.	Growing	awareness
of	particular	conditions	may	also	influence	coding	practices.	In	the	United	States,	Australia,	and
elsewhere,	for	example,	there	have	been	large	increases	in	mentions	of	Alzheimer’s	disease
and	other	dementias	on	death	certificates	since	2000.	These	partly	reflect	some	changes
associated	with	the	introduction	of	ICD-10	but	also	effects	of	increased	awareness	and	some
specific	campaigns	to	increase	recognition	of	these	conditions	(Moschetti	et	al.	2012).
Older	people,	now	the	vast	majority	of	decedents	in	low-mortality	populations,	are	more	likely	to
suffer	multiple	pathologies	and	the	number	of	conditions	recorded	on	death	certificates	has
been	increasing.	Choice	of	one	over	another	as	the	‘true’	underlying	cause	of	death	is	bound
to	be	partially	arbitrary.	In	the	United	Kingdom,	for	example,	between	1984	and	1992	some	25
per	cent	fewer	deaths	were	allocated	to	respiratory	diseases	purely	as	a	result	of	changes	in
the	rules	used	to	select	underlying	cause	of	death	(Griffiths	and	Brock	2003).	Multiple	coding	of
death	certificates	and	analyses	by	all	mentions	of	a	condition	may	be	more	informative	but
such	data	are	available	in	only	a	few	countries	(Anderson	2011).	Variations	in	death	certificate
coding	reflecting	differences	in	medical	knowledge	and	diagnosis,	in	the	extent	to	which
autopsies	are	used,	in	classification	systems,	and	the	quality	of	registration	systems	are	a
major	factor	complicating	analyses	of	trends	over	time	or	between	countries.
Deaths	assigned	to	symptoms,	signs	and	ill-defined	conditions	such	as	‘old	age’	or	‘senility’	or
other	causes	lacking	diagnostic	meaning,	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘garbage	codes’,	present	a
particular	problem.	Mathers	et	al.	(2005)	in	an	investigation	of	coverage	and	quality	of	cause	of
death	coding	in	2003,	found	that	in	some	countries	over	40	per	cent	of	deaths	were	assigned
to	these	‘causes’.	Only	23	countries	met	their	definition	of	high	quality	of	data	with	coverage	of
at	least	90	per	cent	and	fewer	than	10	per	cent	of	deaths	assigned	to	ill-defined	codes.
Variations	in	coding	practices	and	use	of	ill-defined	codes	complicate	comparisons	over	time,
as	well	as	between	countries.	Preston	(1976)	argued	that	there	was	an	inverse	association
between	the	proportions	of	deaths	assigned	to	circulatory	diseases	and	to	ill-defined	causes,
and	that	part	of	the	apparent	twentieth-century	epidemic	in	heart	disease	mortality	in	richer
countries	may	have	been	an	artefactual	consequence	of	improvements	in	death	certification.	A
review	of	the	proportion	of	all	deaths	in	England	and	Wales	assigned	to	circulatory	diseases
and	to	ill-defined	causes	in	age	groups	over	65	from	1911–1915	to	2001–2010	is	instructive.
Early	in	the	twentieth	century,	large	proportions	of	deaths	among	the	very	old	were	assigned	to
ill-defined	categories	and	declines	in	this	proportion	were	associated	with	increases	in	the
proportion	attributed	to	circulatory	diseases.	The	proportion	of	ill-defined	deaths	in	the	oldest
group	aged	80	and	over	was,	however,	slightly	higher	in	2001–2010	than	in	the	preceding
period,	reflecting	increased	assignment	to	‘old	age’	as	a	cause.	Reasons	for	this	are	unclear,
although	the	cessation	in	1993	of	further	enquiry	into	vague	causes	of	death	may	have	been	a
small	contributory	factor.	Use	of	this	‘cause	of	death’	is	likely	to	be	reversed	again	in	response
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to	the	2000–2005	public	enquiry	into	the	case	of	Harold	Shipman,	a	British	family	doctor	whose
serial	murder	of	over	250	elderly	patients	was	not	detected	for	many	years;	an	illustration	of
the	importance	of	surveillance	of	deaths	for	reasons	other	than	epidemiological	or
demographic	investigation.
In	countries	which	lack	adequate	certification	and	registration	systems,	data	on	deaths	by
cause	are	seriously	limited.	Attempts	have	been	made	to	develop	verbal	autopsies,	protocols
for	collecting	information	from	lay	informants	which	can	be	reviewed	by	physicians	and	used	to
assign	cause	of	death	(Wang	et	al.	2007).	This	approach	has	been	useful	in	a	number	of	small
investigations	and	is	being	employed	on	a	larger	scale,	for	example,	in	India	(Gajalakshmi	and
Peto	2011).	However,	a	recent	study	tested	physician-certified	verbal	autopsies	in	six	sites	in
four	poorer	countries	against	gold	standard	assessment	and	found	a	concordance	of	less	than
50	per	cent,	with	substantial	variability	by	cause	and	physician	(Lozano	et	al.	2011).	In	the
absence	of	routinely	recorded	data,	estimates	may	be	obtained	by	modelling.	This	has	been
used	for	the	important	issue	of	establishing	the	number	of	deaths	from	HIV/AIDS.	The	most
ambitious	exercise	is	the	Global	Burden	of	Disease	programme	which	has	used	a	large	array	of
sources	and	methods,	including	expert	knowledge,	vital	registration,	field	surveys,
surveillance,	and	police	and	mortuary	data	to	derive	estimates	of	cause-specific	mortality	by
age	and	sex	for	235	separate	causes	for	every	country	in	the	World	(Wang	et	al.	2012).
Other	data	sources
Many	countries	have	a	range	of	surveys	which	provide	more	detailed	information	on,	for
example,	health-related	behaviour,	family	building	strategies,	reasons	for	migration,	or
information	on	biomarkers	that	would	be	impossible	to	collect	in	a	census.	In	poorer	countries,
where	other	data	sources	are	scarcer,	surveys	often	present	the	best	source	of	data	on	basic
demographic	parameters.	Data	quality	is	potentially	better	in	a	survey	than	a	census,	as	it	is
more	likely	that	well-trained	interviewers	can	be	used.	The	World	Fertility	Survey	(WFS),	an
international	population	research	programme	launched	in	1972	to	determine	fertility	levels
throughout	the	world,	and	its	successor,	the	Demographic	and	Health	Survey	Programme
(DHS),	have	been	particularly	valuable	in	providing	demographic	and	health	data	for	a	range	of
poorer	countries.	Other	approaches	include	multi-round	surveys,	in	which	respondents	are
asked	about	events	since	last	contact,	and	dual-record	systems	which	involve	two
independent	data	collection	systems	(one	often	a	multi-round	survey),	the	results	of	which	are
then	combined.	This	method	allows	some	estimation	of	missed	events,	but	is	expensive.	These
approaches	are	described	in	more	detail	in	most	demographic	textbooks	(Preston	et	al.	2001;
Rowland	2003;	Siegel	and	Swanson	2004).
The	raw	materials	of	demography	relate	to	individuals’	most	personal	experiences—sexual
activity,	family	formation,	birth	control,	reproduction,	marital	breakdown,	illness,	and	death.	All
of	these	occur	in	a	social	framework	which	attaches	value	to	some	of	these	behaviours	and
stigmatizes	others.	Not	surprisingly,	respondents	in	censuses	and	surveys	may	be	reluctant	to
disclose	non-marital	pregnancies,	illegal	abortions,	undocumented	migration,	or	deaths	of
relatives	from	AIDS.	Concealment	has	also	been	the	policy	of	some	national	governments
which	have	treated	demographic	data	as	official	secrets.	Additionally,	the	enormous	potential
complications	arising	from	people’s	uncertainties	about	age	or	other	‘basic’	characteristics
including	children	ever-born;	uncertain	recollections	of	prior	events	and	the	vast	scope	for
administrative	errors	have	to	be	considered.	The	demographer’s	traditional	obsession	with	data
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quality	is	hence	understandable.	Differences	in	perceptions	and	reporting	of	health	status	are
also	problematic	and	have	bedevilled	attempts	to	make	international	comparisons	of	health
status	as,	even	if	questions	are	harmonized,	the	ways	people	respond	to	them	are	not	(Ritu	et
al.	2002).
The	statistics	produced	in	series	like	the	United	Nations	Demographic	Yearbooks	have	their
origins	in	what	is	or	has	been	done	by	millions	of	people,	mediated	by	what	is	said	about	these
events	and	experiences,	further	filtered	by	how	this	is	recorded,	processed	and	analysed.
Some	assessment	of	data	quality	is	given	in	the	United	Nations	Demographic	Yearbooks,	but
sometimes	users	may	pay	insufficient	attention	to	this.	A	number	of	other	organizations	also
produce	international	reference	works	and	databases	including	the	World	Health	Organization
(WHO),	the	World	Bank,	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development	(OECD),
Eurostat,	The	United	States	Census	Bureau	International	Data	Base	(United	States	Census
Bureau	n.d.),	and	the	Human	Mortality	Database.	In	most	cases,	these	are	available	free	of
charge	online.
The	analysis	of	demographic	data
A	standard	array	of	techniques	and	measures	forms	the	basis	of	much	demographic	analysis;
the	most	common	of	these	are	described	briefly	here.	Further	detail	is	supplied	in	a	number	of
textbooks	(Preston	et	al.	2001;	Rowland	2003;	Siegel	and	Swanson	2004).	Analysis	involves
not	just	the	application	of	a	particular	technique,	but	also	decisions	about	what	units	of	analysis
to	use	and	how	to	group	them.	A	major	distinction	is	between	period	and	cohort	analysis.
Period	analysis	deals	with	events	of	a	particular	time	period	(e.g.	mortality	rates	from	2005	to
2010)	while	cohort	analyses	follow	the	experience	of	individuals	through	time.	Cohorts	in	this
sense	are	defined	as	groups	of	people	who	have	experienced	the	same	significant	event	at	the
same	time.	Thus	birth	cohorts	comprise	people	born	in	a	particular	year	or	group	of	years	and
marriage	cohorts	those	marrying	at	a	particular	time.	Cohort	and	life-course	approaches	to
analysing	mortality	and	other	indicators	of	population	health	have	an	intuitive	appeal	and	are
increasingly	used,	both	fuelling	and	fuelled	by	a	growing	number	of	longitudinal	studies.	Cohort
analysis	of	time	series	data	may	be	used	in	the	absence	of	specially	collected	longitudinal
data.
Cohort	and	period	are	two	of	the	dimensions	which	‘place’	persons	in	time;	the	third	is	age.
Duration	effects	(such	as	duration	of	marriage,	proximity	to	death,	or	length	of	exposure	to	a
particular	pathogen)	may	also	be	important.	Cohort	effects	may	be	substantial	and,	unless
allowed	for,	may	mask	relationships	between	age	and	various	risks.	Differences	in	the	smoking
behaviour	of	cohorts,	for	example,	have	a	major	effect	on	the	relationships	between	age	and
smoking-related	disease	observed	at	different	periods	(Grundy	1997).
Decisions	about	whether	to	use	individuals,	families,	households,	or	geographic	areas	as	units
of	analysis	are	often	constrained	by	data	availability.	Until	relatively	recently,	most	census	data
were	only	available	as	aggregate	tabulations,	but	individual-level	information	is	increasingly
available.	Other	innovations	include	the	development	of	samples	including	linked	census,	vital
registration,	and	in	some	cases	health	service	data	such	as	the	Longitudinal	Studies	available
for	countries	of	the	United	Kingdom	and	a	number	of	others	(Young	et	al.	2010).	In	these	data
sets,	individuals’	census	records	are	linked	with	their	vital	registration	records	so	numerator–
denominator	biases	in,	for	example,	the	analysis	of	mortality	are	avoided.	In	Nordic	countries,
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the	whole	population	has	been	assigned	personal	identification	numbers	facilitating	linkage	of
information	from	a	range	of	registers.	Linkage	to	use	of	health	and	care	services	is	also
available	in	some	countries,	such	as	Finland.
These	advances	have	greatly	extended	the	material	available	for	analyses	of	variations	in
demographic	behaviour,	and	their	consequences.	They	have	also	raised	complex	security	and
confidentiality	issues	fuelling	debate	over	appropriate	restrictions	on	access	to	data.
The	measurement	of	fertility
Fertility	means	the	childbearing	performance	of	a	woman,	couple,	or	population.	Generally	only
live	births	are	included.	The	term	fecundity,	by	contrast,	is	used	to	refer	to	the	physiological
capability	of	producing	a	live-born	child.	A	rough	idea	of	fertility	may	be	gained	from	using
census	or	survey	data	to	calculate	child–woman	ratios:	the	ratio	of	0–4-year-olds	to	women
aged	15–49.	However,	the	survival	of	infants	(and	their	mothers)	and	the	age	structure	of	the
female	population	affects	these	ratios,	so	they	are	generally	only	used	if	no	other	data	are
available.
The	simplest	measure	of	fertility	commonly	used	is	the	crude	birth	rate—the	number	of	births	in
a	particular	year	per	1000	population.	As	the	denominator	of	this	includes	those	not	‘at	risk’	of
giving	birth	(women	outside	reproductive	age	groups	and	men),	it	is	really	a	ratio	rather	than	a
rate.	Crude	birth	rates	are	influenced	by	the	age	structure	of	the	population,	but	less	seriously
so	than	crude	death	rates.	In	2005–2010	crude	birth	rates	ranged	from	less	than	10	per	1000	in
parts	of	Europe	to	nearly	50	per	1000	in	the	highest	fertility	countries	of	sub-Saharan	Africa.
Slightly	more	sophisticated	is	the	general	fertility	ratio—births	per	1000	women	of	reproductive
age	(generally	defined	as	aged	15–49	or	15–44).	Where	data	allow,	age-specific	fertility	rates
(births	per	1000	women	of	a	particular	age	or	age	group)	are	preferred.	These	are	frequently
summarized	using	the	total	fertility	rate	(TFR).	Where,	as	is	usually	the	case,	period	data	are
used	to	calculate	this,	it	indicates	how	many	children	women	in	a	hypothetical	cohort	would
have	if	they	experienced	current	age-specific	fertility	rates	throughout	their	reproductive	life.
This	measure	is	sometimes	explicitly	denoted	TPFR	(total	period	fertility	rate).	In	low-mortality
populations,	a	TFR	of	2.1	is	taken	to	indicate	replacement	level	fertility	as,	under	this	regime,	a
cohort	of	women	would	be	succeeded	by	a	cohort	of	daughters	of	the	same	size	(after	some
allowance	for	mortality	and	the	fact	that	105–106	boys	are	born	for	every	100	girls).
One	difficulty	with	the	TFR	is	that	it	is	affected	by	changes	in	the	‘tempo’	as	well	as	the
‘quantum’	of	childbearing.	If	women	start	delaying	their	fertility	but	‘catch	up’	later,	there	will	be
a	divergence	between	cohort	and	period	measures,	as	the	latter	will	be	based	partly	on	the
behaviour	of	earlier	cohorts	whose	timing	of	births	was	different.	Similarly,	if	women	have
children	earlier,	TFRs	will	rise,	even	if	eventual	family	sizes	remain	unchanged.	This	means	that
period	measures	are	much	more	volatile	than	cohort	ones.	For	example,	the	US	TFR,	having
risen	in	the	early	parts	of	this	century,	fell	by	more	than	10	per	cent,	from	2.12	to	1.89,
between	2007	and	2011	(Hamilton	et	al.	2012).	For	these	reasons,	many	statistical	offices	use
cohort,	rather	than	period,	measures	of	fertility	as	the	basis	for	projections.
More	sophisticated	measures	of	fertility	include	parity	progression	ratios.	These	indicate	the
probability	of	proceeding	from	one	birth	to	another	(e.g.	what	proportion	of	mothers	with	two
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children	progress	to	having	a	third).	Parity	progression	ratios	are	normally	calculated	for
cohorts	who	have	completed,	or	nearly	completed,	their	childbearing	but	it	is	also	possible	to
use	data	on	births	by	birth	order	to	derive	period	progression	ratios	(Bongaarts	and	Feeney
1998).
In	the	past,	demographers	often	preferred	to	calculate	age-specific	marital	fertility	rates	(and
TFRs	and	other	measures)	on	the	grounds	that	the	unmarried	population	is	not	‘at	risk’	(or	at
reduced	risk)	of	childbearing.	Changes	in	marital	fertility	indicative	of	deliberate	attempts	to	limit
family	size	are	regarded	as	one	of	the	defining	features	of	the	fertility	‘transition’	(see	later)	and
so	distinguishing	these	from	changes	due	to	variations	in	the	‘at	risk’	(married	population)	has
been	particularly	emphasized.	However,	rises	in	non-marital	childbearing,	which	now	account
for	over	40	per	cent	of	births	in	countries	such	as	France,	the	United	States,	and	United
Kingdom,	mean	that	restricting	analyses	to	marital	fertility	is	generally	no	longer	appropriate.
Reproduction	rates
In	the	absence	of	migration	and	with	fixed	mortality,	populations	will	grow	if	mothers	replace
themselves	with	more	than	one	(surviving)	daughter	and	decline	if	they	have	fewer	than	one.
Theoretically,	it	would	also	be	possible	to	measure	the	replacement	of	fathers	by	sons,	but	in
practice	the	difficulties	involved	in	obtaining	paternity	data	make	this	infeasible.	Reproduction
rates	thus	relate	only	to	female	fertility—births	of	daughters.	The	gross	reproduction	rate	(GRR)
is	derived	in	the	same	way	as	the	TFR	except	that	age-specific	birth	rates	based	only	on	births
of	daughters	are	used	in	the	calculation.	The	net	reproduction	rate	(NRR)	makes	an	allowance
for	mortality;	specifically	the	chance	that	a	daughter	will	herself	survive	to	childbearing	age.
The	NRR	cannot	be	calculated	unless	both	age-specific	fertility	and	mortality	data	are	available
(although	it	can	be	approximated	using	the	GRR	and	appropriate	life	table	survival	data).
Changes	in	either	fertility	or	mortality	(or	both)	will	mean	a	divergence	between	period
measures	(based	on	the	experience	of	a	hypothetical	cohort)	and	the	experiences	of	real
cohorts.
Summary	information	on	measures	of	fertility	and	reproduction	is	shown	in	Boxes	6.3.2	and
6.3.3.
Box	6.3.2	Fertility	measures
Definitions
Fertility:	the	childbearing	performance	of	individuals,	couples,	or	populations.
Fecundity:	the	physiological	capability	of	producing	a	live	birth.
Parity:	the	number	of	children	previously	born	alive	(or	sometimes	number	of	previous
confinements)	to	a	woman	or	couple.	Nulliparous	women	are	those	who	have	borne	no
children.
Measure
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Crude	birth	rate:	the	ratio	of	births	in	a	year	(other	specified	period)	to	the	average
population	in	the	same	year/period	(mid-year	population),	expressed	per	1000:
General	fertility	rate:	births	to	women	aged	15–44/49	in	a	year/period	per	1000	women
aged	15–44/49	in	the	same	period:
Age-specific	fertility	rate	(ASFR):	number	of	births	to	women	aged	x	(or	x	to	x	+	n)	per
1000	women	aged	x	(or	x	to	x	+	n).	‘n’	refers	to	the	length	of	an	age	interval.
ASFRs	are	frequently	calculated	for	5-year	age	groups	from	15–19	to	40–44	or	45–49.
Total	(period)	fertility	rate	(TFR/TPFR):	the	sum	of	the	age-specific	fertility	rates	for	all
reproductive	age	groups	for	a	particular	period	(usually	a	year),	conventionally	expressed
per	woman.	The	TFR	indicates	how	many	children	a	woman	would	have	if	throughout	her
reproductive	life,	she	had	children	at	the	age-specific	rates	prevalent	in	the	specified	year
or	period.
x	=	49:
where	‘f ’	is	the	age-specific	fertility	rate	at	age	x.	If	rates	for	age	groups,	rather	than
single	years,	are	used	then	the	sum	of	the	age-specific	rates	must	be	multiplied	by	the
number	of	single	ages	included	in	the	group	(usually	five).
x	=	45–49:
Parity	progression	ratio:	the	probability	of	a	women	of	parity	x	progressing	to	parity	x	+	1.
Box	6.3.3	Reproduction	rates
Measures
CBR = ×1000.number	of	birthsmid-year	population
GFR = ×1000.number	of	births	to	women	aged	15 −44/49mid-year	population	of	women	aged	15 −44/49
ASFR = ×1000.births	to	women	aged	xmid-year	population	of	women	aged	x
TFR =∑
x=15
x=49
fx
x
TFR = 5 ∗ .∑
x=15−19
x=45−49
fx
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Gross	reproduction	rate	(GRR):	the	sum	of	the	age-specific	female	fertility	rates	(births	of
daughters),	for	all	reproductive	age	groups	for	a	particular	period	(usually	a	year)
conventionally	expressed	per	woman.	The	GRR	indicates	how	many	daughters	a	woman
would	have	if,	throughout	her	reproductive	life,	she	had	children	at	the	age-specific	rates
prevalent	in	the	specified	year	of	period.	The	GRR	can	be	calculated	either	by	summing
female	age-specific	fertility	rates	(relating	to	births	of	daughters	rather	than	all	births)	or
using	the	formula:
The	proportion	of	female	births	can	be	taken	as	0.488	(100/205)	in	the	absence	of	more
detailed	information.
Net	reproduction	rate	(NRR):	the	average	number	of	daughters	that	would	be	borne,
according	to	specified	rates	of	mortality	and	of	bearing	daughters,	by	a	female	subject
through	life	to	these	rates.	The	NRR	employs	the	same	fertility	data	as	the	GRR,	but	also
takes	into	account	the	effects	of	mortality.	An	NRR	of	1.0	indicates	that	a	population’s
fertility	and	mortality	levels	would	result	in	exact	replacement	of	mothers	by	daughters.
The	measurement	of	mortality
As	for	fertility,	the	simplest	measure	of	mortality	is	the	crude	mortality	rate,	deaths	per	1000
population.	This	is	strongly	influenced	by	age	structure.	Although	life	expectancy	at	birth	in	the
more	developed	regions	of	the	world	in	2005–2010	was	some	10	years	longer	than	in	less
developed	regions	(76	years	and	66	years	respectively),	crude	death	rates—deaths	per	1000
population	of	all	ages—were	higher	in	the	more	developed	regions	(10.0	compared	with	8.0	in
less	developed	regions)	(UN	2011).	Age	(and	sex)	specific	rates,	or	measures	based	on	them,
are	therefore	much	to	be	preferred	if	data	are	available	to	calculate	them.	Both	direct	and
indirect	standardization	are	sometimes	used	to	make	comparisons	between	populations	with
different	age	and	sex	structures.	Standardized	mortality	ratios	(SMRs)	are	calculated	using
indirect	standardization.	This	involves	selecting	a	set	of	‘standard’	age-specific	mortality	rates,
for	example,	those	for	a	national	population,	and	applying	these	to	the	numbers	of	people	in
the	relevant	age	groups	in	the	subpopulation	of	interest—for	example,	the	population	of	a
particular	region.	This	yields	an	‘expected’	number	of	deaths—the	number	of	deaths	there
would	be	in	the	subpopulation	if	age-specific	death	rates	were	the	same	as	those	in	the
standard	population.	The	ratio	of	observed	to	expected	deaths	gives	the	SMR.	Thus	an	SMR	of
1.24	indicates	that	mortality	in	the	sub	population	is	24	per	cent	higher	than	in	the	standard
population,	after	allowing	for	age	differences.	SMRs	are	useful	summary	measures	of
differences	in	mortality,	but	give	no	indication	of	the	level	of	mortality.	In	direct	standardization,
widely	used	by	WHO	and	national	statistical	offices,	age	and	sex	specific	rates	are	applied	to
an	external	‘standard’	population,	such	as	the	European	Standard	Population,	to	produce	an
overall	standardized	(weighted)	death	rate.
Age-specific	death	rates	are	calculated	using	the	numbers	of	deaths	at	age	x	(or	between
ages	x	and	x	+	n)	in	a	particular	year	as	the	numerator	and	the	mid-year	population	of	the
same	age	as	the	denominator.	The	rate	is	conventionally	expressed	per	1000	or	per	100,000
population.	The	mid-year	population	is	used	as	a	measure	of	the	average	population	at	risk	on
the	assumption	that	deaths	are	evenly	distributed	throughout	the	year.	For	some	age	groups,
GRR = TFR×proportion	of	female	births.
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notably	infants,	this	assumption	is	invalid.	In	low-mortality	populations,	deaths	in	the	first	3	days
of	life	may	account	for	half	or	more	of	all	deaths	in	the	first	year	of	life.	Moreover,	information
on	the	size	of	population	aged	less	than	1	normally	comes	from	birth	data	(as	in	9	out	of	10
years	relevant	census	data	will	not	be	available).	For	these	reasons	live	births	in	a	particular
year	are	conventionally	used	as	the	denominator	of	the	infant	mortality	rate	while	deaths	to
infants	aged	less	than	1	constitute	the	numerator.	Some	infants	dying	in	a	given	year	will	have
been	born	in	the	previous	year	and	some	born	in	the	year	in	question	will	die	the	following
year.	This	can	cause	distortions	if	there	are	large	annual	fluctuations	in	numbers	of	births	(or
infant	deaths)	and	often	3-year	averages	are	preferred.	Deaths	at	very	old	ages	are	also	not
evenly	distributed	throughout	the	year	and	an	adjustment	is	often	made	to	allow	for	this.
Infant	mortality	rates	(IMRs)	were	very	high	in	some	parts	of	historical	Europe—with	300	or
even	400	deaths	per	1000	live	births	in	regions	of	Russia	and	Germany	at	the	end	of	the
nineteenth	century	(van	de	Walle	1986).	In	England	and	Wales	at	the	start	of	the	twentieth
century,	there	were	some	140	infant	deaths	per	1000	live	births.	Infant	mortality	in	high-income
countries	is	now	extremely	low—fewer	than	five	infant	deaths	per	1000	live	births	in	many
European	countries,	Australia,	Japan,	South	Korea,	Hong	Kong,	and	Singapore.	There	have	also
been	huge	falls	in	infant	mortality	in	many	poorer	countries;	in	2011	China	and	India	had
reported	IMRs	of	13	and	47	respectively	(WHO	2013).	Rates	remain	high	in	some	of	the	very
poorest	countries—over	100	deaths	per	1000	live	births.
Variations	on	this	scale	have	substantial	demographic	impacts.	Infant	mortality	has	also
attracted	particular	interest	because	of	links	with	fertility	behaviour	and	as	an	indicator	of
public	health	conditions.	Particularly	in	this	latter	context,	perinatal,	early	and	late	neonatal	and
post	neonatal	mortality	rates	are	often	distinguished	where	data	allow	(see	Box	6.3.4).
Box	6.3.4	Mortality	measures
Measures
Crude	death	rate:	the	ratio	of	deaths	in	a	year	(other	specified	period)	to	average
population	in	the	same	year/period	(mid-year	population),	expressed	per	1000:
Age-specific	mortality	rate	(ASMR):	number	of	deaths	to	persons	aged	x	(or	x	to	x	+	n)
per	1000	persons	aged	x	(or	to	x	+	n):
Standardized	mortality	ratio	(SMR):	the	ratio	of	observed	to	expected	deaths	in	a	study
population.	Expected	deaths	are	calculated	by	applying	a	set	of	standard	age-specific
mortality	rates	to	the	age	distribution	of	the	study	population.	Standardized	ratios	are	only
useful	for	comparisons.	They	have	no	intrinsic	meaning.
CBR = ×1000.number	of	deathsmid-year	population
ASMR = ×1000.deaths	to	persons	aged	xmid-year	population	of	persons	aged	x
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Infant	mortality	rate	(IMR):
Sometimes	decomposed	into	neonatal	mortality	rates	(deaths	of	live	born	infants	during
the	first	4	weeks)	and	post-neonatal	mortality	(from	4	to	52	weeks).
The	perinatal	mortality	rate	measures	late	fetal	deaths	(stillbirths)	and	early	neonatal
deaths	relative	to	live	births.
Stillbirths	used	to	refer	to	deaths	of	fetuses	of	28	or	more	weeks’	gestation;	however,	an
earlier	threshold	of	24	weeks	is	now	more	generally	used.
Life	tables
Life	table	analysis	is	a	core	demographic	technique	and	life	tables	provide	one	of	the	most
powerful	tools	for	analysing	mortality	and	other	demographic	processes.	Life	tables	show	the
probability	of	dying	(and	surviving)	between	specified	ages.	They	also	allow	the	calculation	of
various	other	indicators,	including	expectation	of	life.	If	complete	data	on	the	mortality	of	a	birth
cohort	are	available,	then	a	cohort	life	table	may	be	constructed.	However,	the	use	of	cohort
life	tables	is	obviously	only	possible	retrospectively.	More	commonly,	period	life	tables,	based
on	mortality	rates	at	a	particular	time,	are	calculated.	These	life	tables	show	death	(and
survival)	probabilities	for	a	hypothetical	cohort	with	an	arbitrary	radix	(number	of	babies	at	the
beginning)	usually	set	to	10,000,	100,000	or	some	other	multiple	of	100.
Specific	notation,	summarized	in	Box	6.3.5,	is	used	in	life	table	analysis.	The	basis	of	the	table
is	a	set	of	probabilities	of	dying— q —which	are	calculated	from	age-specific	death	rates;	x
here	refers	to	age	at	the	start	of	an	interval	whose	length	is	specified	by	n.	Thus	 q 	refers	to
the	probability	of	someone	alive	at	50	dying	between	age	50	and	age	55.	The	complement	of
q —the	probability	of	surviving—is	denoted	 p .	The	(hypothetical)	number	of	survivors	at
each	age	is	given	by	l ;	thus	l 	equals	the	radix	(of	100,000)	and	l 	the	number	of	survivors	at
age	75.	The	number	of	person	years	lived	in	an	interval	( L )	and	the	total	number	of	person
years	lived	after	a	particular	age	(T )	are	often	not	shown	in	published	tables	but	are	steps	on
the	way	to	the	calculation	of	e —life	expectancy	at	age	x.
Box	6.3.5	Life	table	measures	and	notation
x	=	age	attained	last	birthday.
l 	=	the	radix	of	the	life	table	(hypothetical	number	of	babies),	usually	100,000.
l 	=	number	of	survivors	at	age	x,	so	l 	is	the	number	of	persons	alive	at	age	65	in	the
hypothetical	life	table	population.
×1000.number	of	deaths	to	infants	ages < 1	yearnumber	of	live	births
Perinatal	mortality	rate
= ×1000.stillbirths	+	deaths	under	1	weekstill+live	births
n x
5 50
n x n x
x o 75
n x
x
x
0
x 65
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q 	=	probability	of	dying	between	age	x	and	x	+	n,	so	 q 	is	the	probability	of	dying
between	age	1	and	5	for	a	person	aged	1.
p 	=	probability	of	surviving	between	ages	x	and	x	+	n,	so	 p 	is	the	probability	of
surviving	from	age	65	to	age	85	for	a	person	aged	65.
d 	=	number	of	deaths	between	age	x	and	x	+	n.
L 	=	number	of	person	years	lived	between	x	and	x	+	n.
T 	=	total	number	of	person	years	lived	after	age	x.
e 	=	expectation	of	life	at	age	x,	so	e 	is	expectation	of	life	at	birth.
This	measure	provides	an	indicator	of	mortality	which	is	very	largely	independent	of	the	age
structure	of	the	population	since	it	depends	only	on	age-specific	mortality	rates.	This	makes	it
more	useful	than	either	a	standardized	mortality	ratio	(which	gives	no	indication	of	level)	or	a
crude	death	rate	(which	is	strongly	influenced	by	age	structure).	Life	expectancy	either	at	birth
(e )	or	further	life	expectancy	at	a	particular	age,	say	65	(e ),	is	calculated	by	dividing	the
total	person	years	lived	after	age	0	or	65	(T 	or	T )	by	the	number	of	survivors	aged	0	(l )	or
65	(l ).
Values	of	life	expectancy	at	birth	are	sometimes	(mis)interpreted	as	indicators	of	usual	age	at
death	in	a	particular	population.	In	very	low-mortality	populations	where	most	deaths	occur
within	a	relatively	small	range	of	ages	(see	the	example	of	Japan	in	Fig.	6.3.2);	there	will	be	a
close	correspondence	between	median	and	modal	ages	of	death	and	life	expectancy	at	birth
(which	is	a	mean	value).	However,	in	populations	such	as	Sierra	Leone	where	so	many	deaths
occur	in	infancy,	there	will	be	a	wide	divergence.	There	is	also	sometimes	confusion	about	the
interpretation	of	values	of	further	life	expectancy	at	a	particular	age.	This	is	derived	from
information	about	the	probabilities	of	death	and	survival	at	subsequent	ages,	and	so	is	not
influenced	by	deaths	at	earlier	ages	and	it	is	erroneous	to	think	that,	for	example,	the	further
life	expectancy	of	someone	aged	65	will	equal	life	expectancy	at	birth	minus	65.	The	higher	the
mortality	rates	at	young	ages	the	greater	will	be	this	divergence.	In	2008,	for	life	example,
female	life	expectancy	at	birth	in	the	United	States	was	80.6	years	but	the	further	life
expectancy	of	women	aged	65	was	20.0	years.	The	equivalent	figures	in	1900–1901	were	49
years	and	12.0	years.
Model	life	tables
Patterns	of	age-specific	death	rates	show	similarities	whatever	the	level	of	mortality.	Death
rates	tend	to	be	higher	in	infancy	than	later	childhood	and	rise	with	age	from	around	the	age	of
puberty,	although	in	the	oldest	age	groups	rates	of	increase	tend	to	flatten	out.	Because	of	the
tendency	for	death	rates	at	one	age	to	be	associated	with	death	rates	at	other	ages	in	a	given
population,	it	is	possible	to	derive	hypothetical	schedules,	called	model	life	tables,	describing
variations	in	mortality	by	age	and	sex,	normally	in	terms	of	a	limited	number	of	parameters
which	allow	for	particular	features	of	the	mortality	pattern	of	the	population	considered.	Model
life	tables	are	derived	from	empirical	data	from	countries	where	these	are	available.	They	are
extremely	useful	aids	for	the	estimation	of	mortality	by	age	in	populations	with	defective	data.
n x 4 1
n x 20 65
n x
n x
x
x 0
0 65
0 65 0
65
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They	are	also	used	(in	conjunction	with	fertility	data)	to	show	the	outcomes	of	particular	fertility
and	mortality	regimes	on,	for	example,	population	age	structure	and	for	making	population
projections.	All	demographic	texts	give	further	details	of	their	derivation	and	application.
Other	applications	of	life	table	analysis
Life	tables	are	widely	used	to	analyse	probabilities	associated	with	events	other	than	death,
such	as	risks	of	divorce	or	contraceptive	use	failure	and	discontinuation	rates,	and	in
estimates	of	disability-free	or	healthy	life	expectancy.	Many	chronic	conditions	associated	with
ageing,	such	as	musculoskeletal	and	sensory	impairments,	may	have	serious	implications	for
health	status	but	are	not	directly	life-threatening.	Life	table	methods	are	used	to	decompose
total	life	expectancy	into	‘healthy’	and	‘unhealthy’	or	‘disabled’	components.	This	can	be	done
using	cross-sectional	data	on	morbidity	prevalence	in	conjunction	with	mortality	data,	although
this	has	some	limitations.	More	sophisticated	(and	data	demanding)	multistate	approaches
which	allow	transitions	both	to	and	from	disabled	states	have	also	been	developed	(Manton	et
al.	2006).	Despite	these	technical	advances,	there	is	still	controversy	about	trends	in
indicators	of	the	health	status	of	populations,	including	disability.	To	a	large	extent	this	debate
arises	from	measurement	problems	and	the	difficulties	involved	in	making	comparisons
between	health	indicators	derived	in	different	ways,	a	further	reminder	of	the	importance	of
data	quality	and	measurement.
Multiple	decrement	life	tables	allow	‘decrements’	from	more	than	one	event—for	example,
different	causes	of	death.	Cause	elimination	life	tables	are	also	used	to	identify	the	‘pure’
severity	of	a	particular	cause	of	death.	Multistate	models	allow	analysis	of	a	range	of
transitions,	particularly	those	where	re-entries	into	a	particular	state,	such	as	being	married	or
living	in	a	certain	region,	are	possible.	These	more	sophisticated	applications	of	course	require
more	detailed	data.
The	measurement	of	migration
In	many	countries	migration	is	the	predominant	influence	on	the	spatial	distribution	of	the
population.	In	Asia	and	Latin	America	recent	rural-to-urban	migration	has	resulted	in	the
phenomenal	growth	of	cities,	often	lacking	the	infrastructure	to	meet	the	needs	of	the
expanding	population	for	basic	services	such	as	sanitation	and	power.	In	2010,	52	per	cent	of
the	world’s	population	lived	in	urban	areas	compared	with	29	per	cent	in	1950	(UN	2012).
Measuring	migration	represents	particular	difficulties.	The	classical	definition	of	internal
migration	is	a	permanent	or	semi-permanent	move	across	an	administrative	boundary,	which
means	that	the	extent	of	migration	recorded	depends	partly	on	the	size	of	administrative	areas.
For	example,	in	a	country	divided	into	many	small	areas,	a	move	over	5	kilometres	will	count	as
migration,	which	would	not	be	the	case	for	countries	divided	into	larger	ones.	Hence,
international	comparison	of	internal	migration	rates	is	potentially	misleading.	Even	the
distinction	between	international	and	internal	migration	may	be	problematic	if	boundaries	are
contested	or	changing.	The	temporal	dimension	to	migration	presents	further	difficulties;	what
constitutes	permanent	or	semi-permanent	and	how	should	groups	such	as	seasonal	migrants
be	treated?
The	reason	for	defining	migration	as	a	move	over	a	boundary	is	largely	pragmatic.	Often	only
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moves	of	this	kind	are	recorded;	moreover	this	is	the	information	required	by	local
administrations.	For	research	purposes,	analyses	of	all	moves	(preferably	with	an	indication	of
distance	moved)	may	often	be	preferred.	Some	countries	have	registration	systems	in	which
changes	of	address	are	recorded.	More	commonly,	censuses	are	used	to	find	out	about
migration.	Questions	on	usual	address	1	or	5	years	ago	allow	the	proportion	of	movers	in	the
population	to	be	measured	(except	for	those	aged	less	than	1	or	5).	These	data	also	allow
inflows	and	outflows	between	pairs	of	areas	to	be	measured.	Moves,	as	opposed	to	movers,
are	not	directly	measured	as	someone	moving	several	times	in	the	reference	period	cannot	be
distinguished	from	someone	moving	only	once.	Those	leaving	an	address	and	later	returning	to
it	cannot	be	identified	either.	This	means	that	the	length	of	the	reference	period	used	is
important;	the	proportion	of	movers	in	the	5	years	preceding	a	census	will	not	equal	five	times
the	proportion	moving	in	1	year	before	the	same	census.
In	the	absence	of	direct	census	data,	estimates	of	migration	can	be	made	indirectly	using	the
‘balancing	equation’	referred	to	in	the	following	subsection.	Differences	in	the	size	of	a
population	at	two	points	in	time	not	accounted	for	by	natural	change	(i.e.	births	minus	deaths)
must	be	due	to	migration	(or	data	errors).	If	vital	registration	data	are	available,	then	both	births
and	deaths	can	be	taken	into	account.	If	they	are	lacking,	then	the	survival	of	groups
enumerated	in	the	first	of	a	pair	of	censuses	must	be	estimated	from	a	life	table	and	the	number
of	expected	survivors	compared	with	the	number	enumerated	in	the	second	census	(obviously
ageing	must	be	allowed	for,	so	the	number	of	20–29-year-olds	in	the	first	census	will	be
compared	with	30–39-year-olds	10	years	later).	These	methods	only	allow	estimation	of	net
migration	(balance	between	in-migration	and	out-migration).	Their	major	weakness	lies	in	the
fact	that	the	residual	population	balance	assumed	to	be	due	to	migration	may	in	fact	reflect
differences	in	the	quality	of	the	two	censuses	considered	or	errors	in	the	estimates	of	survival
used.
Survey	data	are	also	used	to	measure	migration	and	potentially	provide	illuminating	information
on	the	reasons	for,	and	consequences	of,	migration.	However,	as	migration	over	long
distances	is	a	relatively	rare	event,	even	large	general	population	samples	may	yield	relatively
few	migrants.	A	similar	problem	besets	samples	of	international	travellers,	such	as	the	UK
International	Passenger	Survey,	designed	to	estimate	flows	of	international	migrants	through
port	or	border	surveys.	Tourists	and	business	travellers	comprise	the	vast	bulk	of	people
entering	or	leaving	so	surveys	are	an	inefficient	way	of	identifying	immigrants	and	emigrants.
Unfortunately,	other	data	are	often	lacking	as	legal	and	administrative	record	systems	are
frequently	concerned	with	citizenship	and	right	of	abode	rather	than	international	migration	per
se	(and	virtually	never	with	emigration).	Estimates	of	the	size	of	immigrant	populations	depend
on	whether	the	measure	used	is	based	on	place	of	birth	or	on	nationality—the	size	of	the	latter
is	influenced	by	policies	on	acquisition	of	citizenship.
Population	dynamics
Any	population	comprises	those	who	have	made	an	entry	and	not	yet	exited.	When	whole
populations	of	defined	geographic	areas	are	considered,	the	only	means	of	entry	are	birth	or
immigration	and	the	only	means	of	exit	death	or	emigration.
The	most	basic	method	of	demographic	analysis	is	the	decomposition	of	overall	population
change	(P 	−	P )	into	its	components	(B,	D,	I,	E):t 0
− = B−D+I −EPt P0
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where	P 	=	population	at	an	end	of	period;	P 	=	population	at	the	beginning	of	a	period;	and	B,
D,	I,	E	represent	respectively	births,	deaths,	immigrations,	and	emigrations	during	the	same
period	(B	–	D	is	referred	to	as	natural	increase	and	I	−	E	as	net	migration).	Population
subgroups	may	be	similarly	defined	in	terms	of	entries	and	exits.	In	the	absence	of	migration,
entry	to	the	population	aged	75–84	is	through	ageing	(passage	from	74	to	75)	exit	is	through
further	ageing	(84	to	85)	or	death.	This	simple	accounting	equation	is	an	important	one,	both
methodologically	and	as	a	formal	reminder	of	the	need	to	consider	past	as	well	as	current
events.
Of	the	three	demographic	determinants	of	population	size,	structure,	and	growth,	fertility	has
historically	been	of	much	greater	importance	than	either	mortality	or	migration.	Every	birth
represents	not	just	an	addition	to	the	current	generation	of	children,	but	also	potentially	an
exponentially	increasing	augmentation	in	the	size	of	future	generations.	Death	carries	no	such
promise	of	future	return.	Births	increase	the	population	only	at	age	zero,	so	making	it	younger,
whereas	deaths	are	spread	across	the	whole	age	range	and	so	have	much	less	impact	on	age
structure.	The	third	determinant—migration—is	generally	not	of	significant	magnitude	to	have	a
major	impact	on	most	national	populations,	although	there	are	exceptions	especially	when
natural	increase	is	close	to	zero.	Increased	levels	of	immigration	to	many	European	countries
since	the	1990s	have	had	quite	an	effect	on	population	size	and	age	structure;	the	population
of	Spain	for	example,	increased	by	10.2	per	cent	between	1999	and	2006	and	over	90	per
cent	of	this	increase	was	due	to	migration	(Sobotka	2008).
For	social	and	biological	reasons	fertility,	mortality,	and	migration	have	interactive	effects.
Decreases	in	mortality	among	those	with	reproductive	potential,	for	example,	influence	not	just
the	size	of	the	age	group	affected	at	the	time,	but	also	the	size	of	succeeding	generations.
Declines	in	male	mortality,	particularly	in	populations	where	large	age	differences	between
spouses	are	common	and	remarriage	of	widows	is	rare,	will	similarly	tend	to	increase	fertility	by
effectively	increasing	the	proportion	of	women	of	reproductive	age	who	are	still	married.
Conversely,	reductions	in	fertility	clearly	reduce	the	risk	of	maternal	mortality	and	may	have
further	positive	effects	on	the	survival	of	mothers,	infants	or	both.	Age	at	motherhood	also
influences	rates	of	population	growth.	The	average	age	of	mothers	at	the	birth	of	their
daughters	is	termed	the	mean	length	of	a	generation	and	is	generally	around	29	years.	A
shorter	interval	will	mean	more	rapid	generational	succession	(and	faster	population	growth).
Migration	affects	other	demographic	parameters	because	migrants	differ	from	the	general
population.	International	migrants	are	generally	young	and	in	good	health	and	often	move	from
relatively	high-	to	low-fertility	populations.	Consequently,	immigrants	may	serve	to	(temporarily)
‘rejuvenate’	the	host	population	and,	at	least	initially,	have	higher	fertility	and	lower	mortality.	In
England	and	Wales,	for	example,	24	per	cent	of	births	in	2011	were	to	mothers	themselves
born	outside	the	United	Kingdom.	Despite	the	disadvantages	they	often	face,	mortality	of
immigrant	groups	is	often	lower	than	that	of	host	populations	because	of	the	differential
selection	of	immigrants.	The	degree	of	selection	tends	to	vary	according	to	difficulties	and
distance	to	be	overcome	in	making	an	international	move.	For	all	these	reasons,	the
demographic	characteristics	of	population	subgroups	largely	comprising	immigrants	and	their
immediate	descendants	may	vary	substantially	from	those	of	the	population	as	a	whole.
Population	projections
− = B−D+I −EPt P0
t 0
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Population	projections	represent	one	of	the	most	widely	used	outputs	of	demographic	analysis.
Strictly	speaking,	a	projection	simply	represents	the	outcome	of	applying	various	assumptions
about	future	fertility,	mortality,	and	migration	and	so	differs	from	a	forecast,	which	implies
prediction.	However,	projections	are	often	treated	as	forecasts	and	the	degree	of	uncertainty
inherent	in	them	is	not	always	sufficiently	recognized,	although	the	production	of	probabilistic
forecasts,	as	in	the	latest	UN	projections,	makes	this	more	explicit.	The	most	common	method
of	projection	is	the	component	method,	based	on	the	balancing	equation	(P 	=	P 	+	B	−	D	+	I	−
E).	Assumptions	are	made	about	the	three	components	of	change—births,	deaths,	and
migration—and	applied	to	age	and	sex	groups	within	the	initial	population	to	give	a	projection	of
future	size	and	structure.	To	a	large	extent	assumptions	are	based	on	recent	trends	together
with	other	information,	for	example,	survey	data	on	fertility	intentions	or	(sometimes)	models	of
change	in	particular	causes	of	death.	Forecasting	fertility	has	generally	been	regarded	as	the
most	problematic	area	of	projection	but	recently	greater	attention	has	been	paid	to	the	errors
that	have	been	made	in	forecasting	mortality	in	developed	countries.	This	has	little	effect	on
age	groups	in	which	survival	is	high,	but	can	have	quite	substantial	impacts	on	forecasts	of	the
number	of	older	people.	Migration	may	be	an	important	element	and	may	be	underestimated,	if
projections	do	not	take	into	account	feedback	loops	whereby	migrant	populations	tend	to
generate	further	migration	(Bongaarts	and	Bulatao	2000).	International	migration	is	also	difficult
to	forecast	as	it	is	affected	by	events	outside	the	country,	is	often	a	sensitive	political	issue
and	may	be	volatile.	Partly	for	these	reasons,	immigration	levels	have	been	consistently	under-
projected	in	forecasts	in	many	European	countries	(Alders	et	al.	2007).
Population	growth
Changes	in	the	size	of	a	population	produced	by	the	surplus	(or	deficit)	of	births	over	deaths
are	termed	natural	increase	(or	decrease).	A	common	indicator	of	growth	is	the	crude	rate	of
natural	increase—the	difference	between	the	crude	birth	rate	(annual	births	per	1000
population)	and	the	crude	death	rate	(annual	deaths	per	1000	population).	If	net	migration	is
zero,	this	will	be	the	same	as	the	growth	rate	of	the	population—the	overall	annual	change	in
the	population	divided	by	the	population	size—(conventionally	expressed	as	a	percentage).	In
several	European	countries	deaths	outnumbered	births	in	the	period	2005–2010,	with	the
largest	deficits	in	Ukraine,	Bulgaria,	Latvia,	Belarus,	Hungary,	Lithuania,	and	the	Russian
Federation.	In	some	others	births	still	outnumber	deaths	even	though	fertility	rates	have	been
below	the	level	required	for	long-term	replacement	for	40	years	or	so.	This	apparent	paradox
largely	reflects	the	fact	that	the	number	of	births	is	a	function	of	the	number	of	potential
mothers,	to	which	immigration	may	also	contribute,	as	well	as	of	their	fertility	patterns.	If	the
former	is	increasing	so	too	may	the	numbers	of	births,	even	if	women	have	fewer	children
each.
The	young	age	structures	of	many	populations	in	the	developing	world	mean	that	these
populations	have	a	huge	built-in	potential	for	growth.	Population	momentum	is	the	measure
which	gives	the	ratio	of	the	ultimate	size	a	given	population	would	achieve	to	current
population	size	if	fertility	were	to	immediately	fall	to	replacement	level.	Even	allowing	for	the
effect	of	HIV/AIDS-related	mortality,	the	population	of	sub-Saharan	Africa	is	expected	to
increase	from	0.86	billion	to	1.96	billion	between	2010	and	2050	(UN	2011),	a	consequence	of
both	population	momentum	and	high	levels	of	fertility.	In	some	low-fertility	countries	there	are
now	concerns	about	‘negative	momentum’—the	prospect	of	decline	in	population	even	if
fertility	rates	increase	somewhat	because	of	successively	smaller	cohorts	of	women	in
t 0
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childbearing	age	groups.
Intrinsic	rate	of	natural	increase:	stable	population	theory
Early	in	the	twentieth	century,	Lotka	(1907)	demonstrated	mathematically	that	a	population
closed	to	migration	and	subject	to	unchanging	age-specific	fertility	and	mortality	rates	for	a
long	period	would	eventually	have	a	fixed	age	structure	(in	which	the	proportion	in	each	age
group	remained	unchanged)	and	would	grow	at	a	constant	rate.	This	type	of	population	is
called	a	stable	population.	The	fixed	age	structure	of	a	stable	population	is	independent	of	the
initial	age	structure—two	very	different	populations	subject	to	the	same	unchanging	rates	for	a
long	period	would	eventually	assume	the	same	structure.	A	particular	case	of	a	stable
population	is	a	stationary	population—one	in	which	birth	and	death	rates	are	constant	and	in
balance	and	so	population	growth	is	zero.	The	L 	column	of	the	life	table	is	an	example	of	a
stationary	population.	The	number	of	births	is	fixed	(the	radix)	and	the	age	distribution	is	also
fixed.	In	non-stationary	stable	populations,	the	age	structure	is	also	fixed	but	the	size	of	every
age	group	is	growing	at	the	same	constant	rate	as	the	overall	population	and	the	number	of
births.	This	is	called	the	intrinsic	rate	of	natural	increase	and	is	a	function	of	the	net
reproduction	rate	and	the	mean	length	of	a	generation	(approximated	by	the	mean	age	of
childbearing).	Non-stationary	stable	populations	can	be	calculated	by	adjusting	the	L 	values
of	a	particular	life	table	to	allow	for	the	intrinsic	rate	of	growth.	These	are	often	published	in
conjunction	with	model	life	tables	to	show	the	effects	of	particular	(unchanging)	fertility	and
mortality	regimes.
Although	stable	and	stationary	populations	are	theoretical	constructs,	real	populations	at
various	times	have	met	the	model	requirements	closely	enough	to	allow	stable	population
theory	to	be	used	to	develop	methods	for	indirectly	estimating	fertility	and	mortality	in
populations	lacking	adequate	directly	derived	data.	Stable	population	models	are	also	widely
used	for	insurance,	pension,	and	personnel	planning.	One	of	the	important	results	of	the	work
of	Lotka	and	his	successors	was	to	show	theoretically	the	important	influence	of	fertility	on	age
structure.
Age	structure
Population	pyramids	graphically	illustrate	the	current	structure	of	populations	and	in	so	doing,
also	provide	insights	into	both	the	future	and	the	past	of	the	population.	High	fertility
populations	have	a	pyramid	shape	with	each	successive	cohort	being	larger	than	its
predecessor.	The	population	pyramid	for	Bangladesh	(Fig.	6.3.3A)	shows	a	typical	pattern	for
a	population	with	a	history	of	high	fertility	but	a	recent	downturn.	Each	successive	cohort	is
larger	than	the	preceding	one,	with	the	exception	of	the	youngest.	‘Old’	populations,	such	as
that	of	England	and	Wales	(Fig.	6.3.3B),	are	more	rectangular	with	a	gradual	tapering	at	the
top.	Bulges	in	population	pyramids	due	to	high	numbers	of	births	have	‘echo’	effects	when
members	of	large	cohorts	themselves	have	children.	Thus	the	baby	boom	experienced	in
many	populations	in	the	post-Second	World	War	period	(precise	timing	varied	between
countries)	had	an	echo	effect	in	the	1980s.
x
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Fig.	6.3.3
Distribution	of	the	population	of	(A)	Bangladesh	and	(B)	the	UK	by	age	and	sex,	2010.
Source:	data	from	United	Nations,	World	Population	Prospects:	The	2010	Revision,	United
Nations,	New	York,	USA,	Copyright	©	2012,	available	from
http://esa.un.org/wpp/documentation/pdf/WPP2010_Volume-I_Comprehensive-Tables.pdf
Historically,	and	apparently	paradoxically,	improvements	in	mortality	in	those	European
populations	which	now	have	high	proportions	of	old	people	in	fact	served	to	offset	the	trend
towards	population	ageing,	as	they	chiefly	benefited	the	young—and	led	to	increases	in	the
proportions	surviving	to	have	children	themselves.	However,	although	fertility	has	the	greatest
potential	impact	on	age	structure	and	population	growth,	in	some	circumstances	mortality	(or
migration)	may	become	a	more	important	influence.	Many	populations	in	richer	countries	now
have	fertility	at	or	below	replacement	level,	life	expectancies	at	birth	close	to	80	and	near
universal	survival	to	the	end	of	the	(female)	reproductive	span.	In	these	conditions,	further
improvements	in	mortality	have	the	greatest	impact	at	old	ages	and	further	population	ageing
occurs	from	the	apex,	rather	than,	or	in	addition	to,	the	base	of	the	population	pyramid.
Mortality	changes	are	now	the	main	motor	of	the	further	ageing	of	a	number	of	populations	with
already	old	age	structures	(Preston	and	Stokes	2012).	Population	age	structures	and
associated	rates	of	growth	or	decline,	changes	in	age	structures	such	as	population	ageing,
and	the	speed	and	stage	of	age	structural	change	all	have	important	economic	and	health
implications	which	have	attracted	considerable	debate	and	controversy.
Many	economists	have	pointed	out	that	population	growth	has	often	provided	a	spur	to	human
ingenuity	and	economic	growth.	Less	positively,	the	countries	which	now	have	the	youngest
age	structures	and	most	rapid	rates	of	population	growth	are	already	suffering	from	land
degradation	and	in	many	cases,	constrained	agricultural	potential	(Alexandratos	2005).	Large
and	growing	child	populations	also	hamper	efforts	at	improving	human	capital	through
education	or	improved	health	(Casterline	2010).
Reduced	fertility	initially	produces	a	‘demographic	dividend’	or	‘window’	when	the	ratio	of
children	to	adults	falls	and	those	in	prime	productive	ages,	the	survivors	of	larger	birth	cohorts,
account	for	a	higher	proportion	of	the	population.	It	has	been	argued	that	this	dividend	of	lower
child	dependency	and	higher	representation	of	adults	in	the	prime	working	age	groups	played
an	important	part	in	the	rapid	economic	development	of	the	‘East	Asian	Tigers’,	like	South
Korea	and	also	China	(Bloom	et	al.	2000).	The	next	phase,	involving	high	and	increasing
representation	of	older	people	may,	it	has	been	suggested,	also	bring	some	economic	benefit
in	the	form	of	increased	savings	(by	the	large	number	of	older	people)	and	so	greater	capital
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available	for	investment	(Mason	and	Lee	2006).	However,	population	ageing	is	more	often
perceived	as	a	challenge	with	potentially	negative	implications	for	both	the	economy	and	for
population	health	(OECD	1999).
The	major	concerns	arising	from	increases	in	the	proportions	of	older	people	relate	to	effects
on	productivity	and	need	for	support	systems	of	various	kinds,	including	pensions,	healthcare
and	long-term	care.	In	OECD	countries,	healthcare	expenditure	is	typically	three	to	five	times
as	high	for	those	aged	65	and	over	as	for	those	aged	under	65.	However	there	is	considerable
international	variation	in	the	proportion	of	GDP	devoted	to	healthcare	spending	for	older	people
which	bears	little	obvious	relationship	to	the	proportion	of	older	people	in	the	population
concerned.
In	populations	which	have	more	recently	moved	to	low	fertility	and	low	mortality	regimes,	the
pace	of	demographic	change	has	been	much	faster	than	occurred	historically	in	Europe.	The
proportion	of	the	Japanese	population	aged	65	and	over	doubled,	from	7	per	cent	to	over	14
per	cent,	between	1970	and	1996.	In	France	a	similar	increase	took	130	years	to	achieve	and
in	Sweden	85	years	(Kinsella	and	Phillips	2005).	More	recently	ageing	populations	have	thus
had	a	much	shorter	period	in	which	to	adapt	to	new	public	health	priorities.	The	origins	of	these
age	structure	changes	lie	in	the	demographic	transition.
The	demographic	transition
Towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	(earlier	in	France)	birth	and	death	rates	started
falling	in	a	number	of	European	countries.	Between	1871–1875	and	1911–1915	the	TFR	for
England	and	Wales,	for	example,	dropped	from	4.8	to	2.8;	by	the	early	1930s	it	was	below
replacement	level,	a	development	which	was	viewed	with	alarm	and	led	to	the	first	Royal
Commission	on	Population.	Although	modern	methods	of	contraception	were	lacking,	it	was
clear	that	this	huge	drop	in	fertility	was	the	result	of	the	deliberate	limitation	of	family	size.	Half
of	couples	married	in	the	1870s	had	six	or	more	children	compared	with	12	per	cent	of	couples
married	in	1911–1915	(Coleman	and	Salt	1992).	Expectation	of	life	at	birth,	meanwhile,
increased	by	some	15	years	between	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	the	early	1930s.
Researchers	attempting	to	relate	such	shifts	in	demographic	regimes	to	economic	and	social
changes,	originated	the	theory	of	the	demographic	transition.	The	‘classical’	view	propounded
by	Notestein	(1945)	and	others	was	that	in	‘traditional’	societies	fertility	and	mortality	are	both
high	and	roughly	in	balance.	Change	is	driven	by	economic	advance	which	results	in	lower
mortality.	Fertility	initially	remains	high,	resulting	in	a	rapid	period	of	population	growth.	After
this	lag,	however,	fertility	also	falls	in	response	to	falling	mortality	and	the	erosion	of	‘traditional’
pro-natalist	values.
This	classical	view	has	since	been	considerably	modified	(Lee	2003).	Coale	and	his
collaborators	in	an	ambitious	project	to	track	the	transition	in	historical	Europe	suggested	that
no	economic	‘threshold’	for	fertility	decline	could	be	identified	and	that	the	pattern	of	decline
seemed	to	follow	regional	groupings,	suggesting	a	cultural	rather	than	a	socioeconomic
dimension	(Coale	and	Watkins	1986).	Falls	in	infant	mortality,	assumed	to	be	a	particularly
important	stimulus	to	fertility	decline,	sometimes	followed	rather	than	preceded	changes	in
fertility.	For	example,	Woods	et	al.	(1989)	argued	that	declines	in	fertility	led	to	reductions	in
infant	mortality,	rather	than	vice	versa	in	England	and	Wales.	In	short,	the	role	of	mortality
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decline	as	a	trigger	and	the	dominance	of	economic	change	have	both	been	questioned.
Caldwell	(1982)	additionally	argued	that	in	non-European	countries,	it	was	not	so	much
socioeconomic	modernization	but	‘Westernization’	involving	increased	emphasis	on	the
nuclear	family	and	a	change	in	intergenerational	wealth	flows	(resulting	in	the	costs	of	children
outweighing	their	potential	benefits)	that	was	the	important	trigger	of	fertility	transition.
Research	on	the	historical	demographic	transition	in	Europe	may	seem	of	limited	relevance	to
contemporary	problems.	However,	this	research	was	fuelled	by	post-war	fears	about
population	growth.	By	1950,	significant	mortality	declines	had	been	achieved	or	initiated
throughout	the	world.	In	China,	for	example,	expectation	of	life	at	birth	increased	from	43	in
1960	to	over	75	by	2010.	Even	in	sub-Saharan	Africa,	a	gain	of	nearly	10	years—from	43	to	52
—was	achieved	between	1950	and	1990,	sadly	since	reversed	although	now	starting	to
increase	again	(World	Bank	1993;	UN	2011).	In	this	context	it	seemed	imperative	to	discover
the	causes	of	fertility	decline	and	use	this	knowledge	to	accelerate	fertility	‘adjustment’	to
falling	mortality.	Was	‘development	the	best	contraceptive’	as	concluded	at	the	stormy	1974
World	Population	Conference;	could	change	be	achieved	through	intensive	family	planning
programmes,	as	the	experience	in	Taiwan	and	South	Korea	seemed	to	suggest;	or	was	some
combination	of	these	and	other	factors	the	key	to	fertility	transition?	Studies	of	societies	in
which	the	fertility	transition	had	occurred	seemed	to	offer	the	best	prospect	of	an	answer	to
these	questions.	While	simple	answers	to	complex	questions	are	rarely	forthcoming,	Coale
(1973)	identified	three	factors	which	he	considered	prerequisites	for	fertility	decline	in
contemporary	populations.	These	were:	that	potential	parents	must	think	it	acceptable	to
balance	the	advantages	and	disadvantages	of	another	child,	that	some	advantage	must	be
gained	from	reduced	fertility,	and	that	effective	techniques	of	fertility	control	must	be	available.
Trends	in	fertility	in	the	second	half	of	the	last	century	and	early	part	of	this	century	have
shown	considerable	divergence	and	shed	some	light	on	these	debates.	TFRs	are	highest	in
sub-Saharan	Africa,	with	Uganda,	Somalia,	Mali,	Timor-Leste,	and	Niger	having	TFRs	above	6.3
in	2005–2010.	In	all	other	world	regions	there	was	clear	evidence	of	onset	of	a	transition	to
lower	fertility	by	the	1970s	or	1980s;	Japan	was	the	first	non-Western	country	to	experience	a
fertility	transition	starting	after	the	Second	World	War.	Globally,	the	estimated	TFR	in	2005–2010
was	2.52,	with	48	per	cent	of	the	world	population	living	in	countries	with	below-replacement
fertility	levels	(UN	2011).	Substantial	fertility	declines	have	occurred	in	a	number	of	countries
which	at	that	time	had	only	a	limited	amount	of	development,	such	as	Sri	Lanka,	Thailand,
China,	and	more	recently	Bangladesh.	One	of	the	largest	and	fastest	fertility	declines	took
place	in	the	Islamic	Republic	of	Iran	where	fertility	fell	from	7.0	in	1980	to	1.9	in	2006	(Abbasi-
Shavazi	et	al.	2009)	defying	assumptions	that	socially	and	religiously	conservative	Muslim
societies	with	low	rates	of	female	employment	would	be	resistant	to	fertility	change.
Recent	interpretations	of	fertility	change	have	reverted	to	considering	development—in	its
broadest	sense	rather	than	restricted	to	consideration	of	average	incomes—a	stronger
influence	in	contemporary	populations	than	ideational	changes,	although	the	relevance	and
role	of	cultural	and	policy	related	factors	is	recognized	(Bryant	2007).	Common	factors
identified	in	poor	rural	populations	where	fertility	has	fallen	significantly	are	well-established
education	systems,	improvements	in	healthcare	and	in	child	survival,	some	form	of	extra-
familial	welfare,	well-organized	local	government,	and	an	organized	family	planning
programme.	Potential	benefits	of	investing	more	resources	in	fewer	children,	as	a	consequence
of	increasing	opportunities	in	urban	or	industrial	livelihoods,	also	seem	to	be	important
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(McNicoll	2006;	Bryant	2007).	The	education	of	women	has	been	identified	as	a	particularly
significant	influence	on	both	falling	fertility	and	improved	infant	survival	(Cleland	1990;	Hobcraft
1993)	and	female	education	and	empowerment	were	recognized	as	key	policy	objectives	at
the	1994	International	Conference	on	Population	and	Development	(UNFPA	1995).
As	noted	earlier,	fertility	rates	remain	high	in	much	of	sub-Saharan	Africa.	Continuing
expressed	preferences	for	large	families	and	other	family	and	social	characteristics	of	African
populations	have	led	some	to	conclude	that	the	model	of	change	seen	in	Asia	and	Latin
America	may	not	be	applicable	to	Africa,	or	at	least	not	to	all	regions	of	Africa	(Caldwell	et	al.
1992).	There	is	nevertheless	evidence	of	unmet	demand	for	family	planning	and	a	strong	case
can	be	made,	on	the	grounds	of	improving	maternal	and	child	health,	for	renewed	investment
in	family	programmes	which	in	some	places	faltered	as	the	policy	focus	and	funding	shifted	to
the	HIV/AIDs	crisis	(Cleland	et	al.	2006).
Recent	trends	have	also	made	it	clear	that	the	end	point	of	fertility	transition	is	not	necessarily
a	fertility	level	around	the	‘replacement	rate’.	In	some	countries,	such	as	Guatemala,	Peru,
Egypt,	Turkey	and	Ghana,	fertility	declines	‘stalled’	(sometimes	temporarily)	at	a	level	higher
than	two	children	per	woman	(Bongaarts	2005).	In	others	they	have	continued	downward
spiralling,	giving	rise	to	a	new	set	of	concerns	about	‘lowest	low’	fertility.
Lowest	low	fertility	and	the	second	demographic	transition
In	contrast	to	the	scenario	of	high	fertility	and	rapid	population	growth	in	some	of	the	poorest
countries,	a	growing	number	of	high-income	countries	now	have	concerns	about	the
implications	of	low	fertility.	Many	of	these	countries	experienced	a	post-Second	World	War
‘baby	boom’	during	the	1950s	and	early	1960s	followed	by	a	1970s	‘baby	bust’	when	fertility
declined	to	very	low	levels.	In	Scandinavia,	France,	the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States,	and
other	English-speaking	countries	fertility	rates	have	since	fluctuated	at	levels	between	1.6	and
replacement	level	with	something	of	an	increase	in	the	first	decade	of	this	century—a	pattern
also	seen	in	many	other	industrialized	countries—however,	this	may	turn	out	to	be	a	temporary
phenomenon	particularly	given	current	economic	conditions.	These	populations	have	also
experienced	a	range	of	family-related	behavioural	changes,	included	marked	increases	in
cohabitation,	non-marital	childbearing,	divorce,	postponed	childbearing,	and	increased	levels
of	childlessness,	described	by	some	as	a	‘Second	Demographic	Transition’	(Lesthaeghe	and
Neidert	2006).	Such	behaviours,	which	have	become	more	usual	among	Northern	European
cohorts	born	from	around	the	1950s	onwards,	are	much	less	prominent	in	Southern	and
Eastern	Europe	and	the	richer	countries	of	South	and	East	Asia.	However,	it	is	mainly	in	these
latter	countries	that	‘lowest	low’	fertility—rates	below	1.3—has	been	prevalent	with	21	countries
from	these	regions	having	TFRs	below	1.3	in	2003	(Goldstein	et	al.	2009).	The	recent	increase
in	fertility	in	developed	societies	meant	that	only	three	of	these	countries,	South	Korea,
Slovakia,	and	Singapore,	had	average	values	below	1.3	in	the	period	2005–2010	(UN	2011).
However,	the	TFR	remained	below	1.5	in	a	large	number	of	other	countries	including	Poland,
Japan,	Germany,	Italy,	Ukraine,	Spain,	and	the	Russian	Federation	in	2005–2010.	An	important
determinant	of	very	low	fertility	in	many	of	these	societies	has	been	a	precipitous	fall	in
marriage	rates	(Billari	and	Kohler	2004).	Japan,	for	example,	has	been	transformed	from	a
society	with	near	universal	marriage	in	the	early	and	mid	twentieth	century	to	one	in	which	a
fifth	of	the	population	will	remain	never-married	at	age	45	(Retherford	et	al.	2001).	In	this	case
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the	erosion	of	arranged	marriages	after	the	Second	World	War	has	played	a	part;	changing
gender	roles	may	also	be	important.	In	some	countries	with	very	low	fertility,	explicit	pro-
natalist	polices	are	under	discussion	or	have	been	introduced,	however	these	remain
controversial	and	of	unclear	effectiveness.
The	proximate	determinants	of	fertility
One	of	the	contributions	of	research	into	the	fertility	transition	has	been	improved
understanding	of	biosocial	influences	on	reproduction.	A	huge	range	of	social,	economic,
cultural,	and	psychological	factors	may	influence	decisions	about	family	building	strategies	and
family	size.	However,	these	can	only	have	effect	if	they	are	translated	into	patterns	of
behaviour	or	physiological	characteristics	that	influence	the	risks	of	conception	or	delivery.
Conversely,	other	patterns	of	behaviour	with	potentially	important	influences	on	fertility	may	be
adopted	with	little	or	no	thought	to	these	consequences.	Davis	and	Blake	(1956)	distinguished
a	series	of	‘intermediate	fertility	variables’:	factors	influencing	exposure	to	risk	of	pregnancy
(marriage	and	coital	frequency),	risk	of	pregnancy	(such	as	contraception),	and	pregnancy
outcome	(spontaneous	and	induced	abortion).	The	most	influential	refinement	of	this	work	is
the	Bongaarts	decomposition	model	(Bongaarts	1978),	which	identified	four	elements	chiefly
responsible	for	observed	fertility	variations:
◆	The	proportion	of	women	married	(exposed	to	risk).
◆	Contraceptive	use.
◆	Induced	abortion.
◆	Post-partum	non-susceptibility	to	conception	(largely	determined	by	breastfeeding
practice).
The	TFR	is	dependent	on	the	interactive	effect	of	these	variables	and	hypothetical	maximum
fertility.	In	modern	‘post-transition’	populations,	fertility	decisions	are	normally	couple-	(or
woman-)	based	and	are	implemented	through	contraception	and	abortion.	In	non-contracepting
populations,	biosocial	factors,	notably	marriage	patterns,	breastfeeding	practices,	sexual
frequency	and,	in	some	populations,	the	prevalence	of	infertility,	are	of	major	importance.
The	social	reproductive	span,	from	entry	to	end	of	marriage	or	any	sexual	union,	nearly	always
starts	later,	often	much	later,	than	menarche.	Fecundity—the	potential	for	bearing	children—
decreases	after	the	third	decade,	more	sharply	after	the	age	of	35	and	in	most	non-
contracepting	populations	the	average	age	at	last	birth	is	around	40.	Social	factors,	as	well	as
biological	ones,	are	important	influences.	Sexual	activity	may	cease	before	menopause
because	of	widowhood	or	separation.	In	some	African	populations,	childbearing	after	becoming
a	grandmother	is	disapproved	of.
For	those	within	the	effective	reproductive	span—biologically	capable	of	childbearing	and	in	a
sexual	union—overall	fertility	is	largely	a	function	of	length	of	intervals	between	births,	itself
largely	determined	by	breastfeeding	patterns.	Among	non-breastfeeding	women,	average
duration	of	post-partum	amenorrhea	is	only	1.5–2	months,	compared	with	18	months	or	more
with	protracted	breastfeeding,	particularly	in	some	populations	where	sexual	activity	is
proscribed	for	breastfeeding	mothers.
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Longer	birth	intervals	and	increased	breastfeeding	also	have	positive	effects	on	infant	and
child	health.	Overall	deaths	before	the	age	of	5	might	be	reduced	by	as	much	as	30	per	cent	in
some	countries	if	closely	spaced	births	were	delayed	(World	Bank	1993;	Cleland	et	al.	2006).
The	epidemiological	transition
Transitions	from	relatively	high-	to	low-mortality	regimes	have	in	all	populations	been
associated	with	transformations	in	the	age,	cause,	and	sex	structure	of	death.	Omran	(1971)
coined	the	phrase	‘epidemiological	transition’	to	describe	this	process.	Changes	in	the
response	of	societies	to	health	and	disease	processes	also	need	consideration.	The	term
‘health	transition’	has	been	proposed	as	one	which	embraces	both	these	phenomena.
Substantial	falls	in	death	rates	from	infectious	and	parasitic	diseases	and	maternal	mortality	are
hallmarks	of	the	epidemiological	transition.	In	England	and	Wales,	over	half	the	gain	in	life
expectancy	at	birth	between	1871	and	1911	was	due	to	reduced	infectious	disease	mortality.
Some	20	per	cent	of	the	total	gain	was	due	to	reduced	death	rates	from	tuberculosis	(Caselli
1991).	Declines	in	these	causes	of	death	were	greater	among	the	young,	hence	deaths	at
older	ages	accounted	for	a	larger	share	of	all	deaths;	the	epidemiological	transition	has	also
been	consistently	associated	with	larger	falls	in	mortality	among	women	than	men.	Changes	in
the	intra-household	allocation	of	resources,	declines	in	causes	of	death	primarily	affecting
women	(such	as	maternal	mortality	and	respiratory	tuberculosis),	gender	differences	in	health-
related	behaviour	and	in	exposure	to	occupational	hazards,	and	the	possibly	greater
susceptibility	of	men	to	stresses	associated	with	socioeconomic	changes,	may	all	be
underlying	factors.
The	relative	contribution	of	various	eighteenth-	and	nineteenth-	century	developments	in
promoting	the	historical	epidemiological	transition	in	the	West	remains	a	matter	of	debate.
Improved	nutrition,	better	housing	and	living	conditions,	public	sanitation	schemes,	and	specific
public	health	initiatives,	such	as	smallpox	inoculation,	all	have	their	adherents.	In	the	early
twentieth	century,	improved	personal	hygiene	practices	and	better	infant	care	were	also
important.	A	common	thread	linking	most	of	these	factors	is	their	relationship	to	overall	social
and	economic	development	and	improvements	in	standards	of	living.	During	the	twentieth
century,	however,	developments	in	medical	technology	and	vector	control	offered	the	potential
for	‘exogenous’	mortality	decline	less	dependent	on	a	particular	country’s	level	of	income	and
development.	One	consequence	was	that	the	relationship	between	per	capita	income	and	life
expectancy	has	shifted	to	the	right	(Preston	1975,	2007).	In	1901,	for	example,	life	expectancy
in	the	United	States	was	49	and	income	per	capita	was	about	US$7300	(2005	purchasing
power	parity).	In	2009,	income	per	capita	in	China	was	almost	identical	($7400)	but	life
expectancy	was	73	years	(http://www.gapminder.org/).
Many	poor	countries	have	been	able	to	achieve	remarkable	falls	in	mortality,	especially	child
mortality,	through	behavioural	change,	improved	education	of	women,	and	introduction	of
relatively	cheap	treatments	and	interventions,	such	as	vaccination	and	antibiotics	(Cutler	et	al.
2006).	Between	1975–1980	and	2005–2010	life	expectancy	at	birth	increased	from	53	to	68	in
Bangladesh	and	from	56	to	68	in	Indonesia	(UN	2011)	and	there	are	now	a	number	of	poor	or
middle-income	countries	with	life	expectancies	at	birth	as	high	as	in	the	United	States.
The	process	of	the	epidemiological	transition	(or	at	least	the	initial	phases)	is	now	complete	or
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under	way	in	much	of	the	world	and	non-communicable	causes	of	death	predominate	in	all
regions	except	sub-Saharan	Africa	(see	Table	6.3.2).	However,	some	recent	changes	have
been	less	benign	and	new	challenges	or	reversals	have	emerged,	notably	the	HIV/AIDS
epidemic	and	the	health	consequences	of	the	collapse	of	the	former	Soviet	Union	(Olshansky
et	al.	1997;	Murphy	2011).	Partly	because	of	these	challenges,	there	are	signs	that	after	a
period	in	which	risks	of	mortality	in	different	parts	of	the	world	showed	a	tendency	to	converge
(i.e.	poorer	countries	caught	up	with	richer	ones),	more	recently	there	has	been	a	trend
towards	divergence.	Another	factor	in	this	may	be	that	recent	successes	in	richer	countries	in,
for	example,	lowering	mortality	from	heart	disease,	have	partly	been	achieved	through
treatments	which	are	harder	to	‘transfer’	to	poor	countries	because	of	infrastructure	and	cost
limitations	(Vallin	and	Mesle	2004;	Ford	et	al.	2007).
Recent	demographic	trends	and	public	health
Population	size,	growth,	and	age	structure	are	all	outcomes	of	variations	in	demographic
behaviours	and	all	have	implications	for	population	health	and	well-being.	Population	ageing	will
almost	certainly	be	the	predominant	demographic	issue	of	the	twenty-first	century	in	nearly	all
richer	and	a	growing	number	of	poorer	countries.	The	strong	association	between	age	and
risks	of	health	impairment	and	disability	imply	growing	needs	for	support	services,	even	if
levels	of	disability	fall.	In	those	countries	which	are	growing	old	before	they	grow	rich,	changes
in	family	support	systems	for	older	people	may	pose	additional	challenges.	A	range	of
strategies	for	responding	to	these	challenges	has	been	proposed,	including	encouraging
longer	working	lives	through	review	of	retirement	and	pensions	policies,	better	organization	of
acute	and	long-term	care	services,	and	initiatives	to	promote	healthy	ageing	(Rechel	et	al.
2013).
Changes	in	marriage	and	family	patterns	also	have	other	public	health	implications.	In	North
America	and	North	West	Europe	(and	also	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean)	high	rates	of
divorce	and	non-marital	childbearing	mean	that	increasing	proportions	of	children	are	spending
at	least	part	of	their	childhood	in	lone-parent	families.	Although	causal	pathways	are	difficult	to
elucidate	because	of	various	selection	effects,	there	is	evidence	indicating	poorer	health
among	lone	mothers	and	their	children,	and	among	unmarried	(especially	divorced)	people
more	generally,	so	these	trends	have	some	negative	implications.
Continuing	improvement	in	child	and	adult	mortality	is	projected	for	the	poorer	world,	based	on
optimistic	assumptions	about	the	course	of	the	HIV/AIDS	epidemic.	In	the	poorest	countries	the
interaction	of	rapid	population	growth,	environmental	degradation	and	conflict	pose	continuing
health	problems	and	the	‘unfinished	agenda’	in	terms	of	health	includes	providing	access	to
contraception	for	women	who	wish	to	space	or	limit	their	children	(Cleland	et	al.	2006).	In	other
middle-	and	low-income	countries,	patterns	of	tobacco	use	are	likely	to	have	a	substantial
effect	on	health	trends	in	coming	decades	(West	2006).
Issues	such	as	international	migration,	economic	and	cultural	‘globalization’,	and	climate
change	all	have	substantial	health	implications	for	the	rest	of	the	twenty-first	century;	all
interact	with	demographic	patterns	and	processes.	Measuring	these	trends	and	assessing	their
effect	on	health	and	demand	for	healthcare	requires	an	understanding	of	population	dynamics
and	population-based	measures,	and	suitable	demographic	data.	Demography	is	thus	an
essential	component	of	public	health.
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